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Patent policy is too important to conduct without a thorough-
going empirical evaluation of performance. Patents are a
multibillion-dollar industry themselves, but, more important,
they stand close to the centre of innovation in the modern
economy and that is the source of the wealth of nations.1
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** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Judge
Plager taught law at the University of Florida, the University of Illinois, and at Indiana
University-Bloomington, where he served for seven years as dean of the law school. He
later served in the Executive Office of the President of the United States in two
administrations, and was appointed to the court in 1989.
This Article is a revised and expanded version of the keynote address given by
Judge Plager at the opening of the Symposium, October 23, 2008. The views expressed are
solely those of the author, and are not necessarily shared by his colleagues in academe or
on the court. In particular, Judge Plager absolves the UNC Department of Philosophy,
from which he graduated, from responsibility for any of the philosophical (or other)
misunderstandings he displays in this essay. Included in that absolution is Professor
Daniel N. Robinson, Oxford University, whose explication of the great ideas of
philosophy has been a source of reflection and new insights, and to whom Judge Plager is
indebted for the felicitous summaries of complex thought which Professor Robinson does
so ably, and from which this essay benefits. Judge Plager also thanks his law clerk, Lynne
Pettigrew, for assistance with this Article.
1. Craig Opperman, James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent System on Trial
and Under Attack, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Oct.-Nov. 2008, at 36, 46 (responding to
comments about Bessen and Meurer's book, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008)).
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INTRODUCTION
In thinking about the range of issues we confront in empirical
legal research, including research into patent law and policy, it is well
to begin with fundamentals. There are three inquiries that define
what scholarship into the human condition cares about-knowledge,
conduct, and governance. Typically, scholarship regarding patent law
and policy is concerned with conduct-who has the right, and under
what circumstances, to make, use, or sell an invention that has been
given recognition under the Patent Act2 (more technically, who has
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention)? By contrast, empirical legal scholarship, including
empirical studies of patent law, involves the process by which human
knowledge is obtained-what we know and how we know it. And
when called upon to adjudicate patent disputes, courts necessarily
engage both the knowledge and conduct questions in the context of
governance, read broadly.
The question of conduct, what is permitted or prohibited under
the patent laws, is a subject of much learning, but it is not the
question to be addressed here. Rather, our concern here is the
question of knowledge, including some of the basic issues empirical
scholarship confronts. And, because it is empirical studies of law that
are our subject of inquiry, a relevant question is how, if at all, does
empirical legal scholarship relate to the method of governance, and in
particular to the judicial process and the ways in which judges decide
cases?
I. THE KNOWLEDGE QUESTION
A. An On-Point Digression
To begin, I will first digress. Digressing, even before one gets to
the subject, reminds me of a story I was told about Professor Felix
Frankfurter after he became a Supreme Court Justice. As an after-
dinner speaker he had a propensity for loquaciousness. His wife, who
sat through many of his after-dinner talks, noted that as a speaker he
had two problems-he always strayed from the subject, and he often
found his way back.
I discuss this business of empirical legal research with the benefit
of some experience. When I was a young member of the Illinois law
faculty, I was teaching among other things estates and trusts. Some of
2. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
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the participants in this Symposium, before they became patent law
savants at the cutting edge of technology and the global economy,
probably taught equally exciting subjects, like contracts and torts. At
least I was teaching property law, the queen of subjects.
The question of why a surviving spouse was given something
called a "forced share," which enabled the survivor to take a piece of
the decedent spouse's estate different from that which the decedent
had planned, intrigued me. A good bit of law school time-in estates
and trusts and tax-was devoted to the ways and wherefores of the
forced share concept. Its historical roots were in common law dower,
but that was a form of social security before there was Social Security.
Why now? Was it true that spouses got even for the slings and arrows
of married life by dying angry and disowning their loved ones, thus
upsetting carefully constructed estate plans?
I spent the better part of a year analyzing data gathered from
New York, Wisconsin, and Illinois about estates and testamentary
dispositions in the probate courts, extracting what I could from the
available data and the little bit of empirical writing there was on the
subject. This was, I am sad to say, at a time before public databases
became available on the internet. My piece got published in the
University of Chicago Law Review under the title of The Spouse's
Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem.3
I learned something about empirical research. First of all, do not
pick cute titles for your work-it gets lost in the indexing, and your
colleagues in the field will not find it. Second, it is hard work; you
give up the readily available fodder of noncopyrighted court opinions
that you can make into casebooks, and from which you can earn
royalties; worse, you may have to leave the comfort of your
professorial office and deal with the real world. And if you need a
tenure article or a thesis piece, there are a lot easier ways to get one
than to poke around in odd collections of data or to try your hand-
and mind-at regression analyses. Even so, I was not particularly
discouraged. In later years, I participated in other empirical studies,4
including a National Science Foundation-sponsored study of class-
3. 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Roger W. Findley & Sheldon J. Plager, State Regulation of
Nontransportation Noise: Law and Technology, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (1974)
(considering noise abatement technologies in the regulatory context); Sheldon J. Plager &
Joel F. Handler, The Politics of Planning for Urban Redevelopment: Strategies in the
Manipulation of Public Law, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 724 (exploring case studies of urban
renewal process).
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action litigation,5 which at least had the benefit of sending me to San
Francisco for a summer.
In more recent years, having left the academy to work in the
government and later on the court, I did not keep as close tabs on the
academic side of empirical legal research as I had as a professor. As a
prelude to this Symposium, I looked at some of the recent academic
literature devoted to empirically-oriented studies. The resurgence of
interest in that kind of work, the quantity of it, and indeed the
creativity of much of it, is truly impressive.
Creative empirical study remains hard work, often slow work,
and work not always appreciated by the dean. When I became dean
of one of the Big Ten law schools, I tried to be appreciative. I
encouraged my new faculty to think in terms of empirical testing of
legal propositions, particularly those propositions that were long
standing and "self-evident," to see whether there was any reason to
continue to believe our received wisdom. In this vein, I note with
appreciation the goal stated by the editors of the recently-established
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies: "Recognizing that many legal
and policy debates hinge on assumptions about the operation of the
legal system, the Journal seeks to encourage and promote the careful,
dispassionate testing of these assumptions."6 As dean I helped bring
to the school a number of double-discipline faculty-law and
economics, of course, but also law and history as well as law and
sociology. I was gratified to see that, in a published ranking of
empirical legal scholarship schools, my old school still ranks
respectably.7
Now I recite this personal history not to claim membership in the
empirical scholarship club, or even sympathy for my errant youth, but
to make clear that what I have to say about empirical research is not
by way of disparaging or discouraging the empirical enterprise, but
5. See Bryant G. Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, Empirical Research and the
Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137 (1985); Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the
Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1988).
6. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Aims and Scope, http://www.wiley.com/bw/
aims.asp?ref=1740-1453&site=1 (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). For further information on
current topics in empirical legal studies, see generally Empirical Legal Studies Blog,
http://www.elsblog.org (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) (featuring editorial supervision by
several scholars from the fields of economics, political science, law, and business).
7. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top
Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141,158 (2006).
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rather is to remind of a bit of historical background to the enterprise,
and to note some of the common issues that history reveals.
B. A Bit of Philosophical History or Historical Philosophy
An early proponent of experimental science and empirical
studies was Sir Francis Bacon, a lawyer and royal court official who
lived and wrote in the late 1500s and early 1600s, during the great
Elizabethan Age. For reasons not relevant here, Elizabeth was not
particularly kind to him, and beheaded his primary sponsor at court,
Lord Essex, who happened also to be Elizabeth's lover. High
government office to this day is not the most secure way to make a
living, and, as before, one's sexual proclivities may not help; however,
for better or worse, we have stopped beheading.
Sir Francis Bacon was the author of The Elements of the
Common Law of England, published in 1597. More importantly, Sir
Francis was an early force in the development of the modern
scientific world view. He is often coupled with Sir Isaac Newton as
among the first of the advocates of testing and reassessing the
ignorances of the antique past.
In 1620, Bacon published his masterpiece, Novum Organum, the
New Instrument. In this work he argued for the authority of
experience over texts; he advocated the need to reject traditional
thought if it did not hold up against what he considered light-
shedding experiments-systematic studies of external events.8 This
was at a time when orthodoxy did not yield readily to the secular
dimension of knowledge. Since the groundbreaking work of Bacon in
social science and Newton in physical science, the history of science
suggests some common concerns with empirical research as a method
of inquiry.
One concern is a problem inherent in data collection itself. In
the course of time, I spent a year as a research professor at the
University of Wisconsin Law School-a law school whose faculty
were known for their interest in studies of law and society and for
doing empirical work, a faculty who were in the forefront of the legal
realism movement, at that time a frontier of its own. The Wisconsin
faculty were careful to avoid the error some early empirical
researchers fell into-thinking that if you can pile the data high
enough, out of the bottom would squeeze some juice of
8. See FRANCIS BACON, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING AND NOVUM ORGANUM
351 (New York, The Colonial Press 1899).
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understanding. Data-gathering is only the first step in doing useful
empirical work-sometimes the easier step. More on this later.
A more practical problem, one with which we lawyers are
familiar, is what can we really believe, what is factually true? We all
know better than to accept at face value what someone tells us, unless
it happens to be our mothers. But do we know enough not to believe
what we think we know? The ultimate philosophical skeptic in that
regard was a Frenchman named Ren6 Descartes.9 He questioned
everything. Do our senses lie to us? Even if they do not, do our
minds process the information without distortion? Are we capable of
processing scattered bits of sensory data into a cohesive picture-and
if we are, can we see it? Can we communicate it to someone else, or
do we lose it in the process? T.S. Eliot put it more poetically:
"Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the
knowledge we have lost in information?"1
Descartes even asked whether it was possible to prove that he
actually existed. He convinced himself that he did exist, articulating
his classic "cogito ergo sum"-"I think therefore I am."11 There is a
joke about Descartes. He went into a bar and had a drink. The
bartender then asked him if he would like another. He replied, "I
think not"-and disappeared.
Of course, the joke in a way misapprehends Descartes' point. He
was not making only an ontological point-I think, therefore I am.
He was also making an epistemological one-I think, therefore I am.
It was the method of inquiry, the way to determine what is, that
mattered. His "proof" of his existence is actually the base on which
he would place all valid knowledge claims.
Some empiricists go further and argue that if something exists, it
exists to some extent; if it exists to some extent, it is measurable; if it
is not measurable, then it must not exist. Gottfried Leibniz
responded to these empiricist arguments with a classic rationalist's
reply: you could build the largest machine ever, with equipment that
gathered and recorded every possible bit of sensory data, and when
9. Descartes (1596-1650) was law trained, fought as a mercenary, was an important
contributor to the physical sciences and especially analytical geometry, in addition to
being perhaps the most important figure in that branch of philosophy known as
"philosophy of mind." For a discussion on the life and philosophies of Ren6 Descartes,
see generally ANDRE GOMBAY, DESCARTES (2007).
10. T.S. ELIOT, Choruses from "The Rock," in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS:
1909-1950, at 96, 96 (1952).
11. RENt DESCARTES, PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY 5 (Miller & Miller trans., 1983).
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you got through, all you would have is an indigestible mass of detail. 2
You still need that ultimate god-or-nature-given mind that can
synthesize data and have new ideas. Unless there is an organizing,
self-reflecting power-the intellect-experience would count as
nothing.
These fundamental questions that underlie human perception
and understanding point to matters that necessarily have to be taken
into account when assessing what we learn through empirical
research. Among the great philosophers of this era, perhaps the one
who would be closest to modern-day empirically focused law-
educated scholars, is David Hume. He believed that it is the human
condition that underlies all philosophical and scientific thought, and
that such thought is necessarily limited and shaped by the ways of
human nature and our habits of expression.13 As Professor Robinson
in describing Hume's thought put it, "What is 'essentially' human are
just those features reliably associated with actual human beings as
repeatedly observed." 4 Hume's writing on the concept of causation
and how the mind works on the evidence gleaned by the senses
remains critical to an understanding of this most basic of legal
notions.
II. GOVERNANCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
A. How Judges Do Their Work
In terms of modern-day application, the question is what, if
anything, does the empirical enterprise have to say about how judges
do their work, and, if patent law and policy is our focus, how the
judges of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit do theirs? If it
is not too immodest to note, this court, because of its exclusive
jurisdiction over patent litigation, effectively is the overall arbiter of
patent jurisprudence, not, as the saying goes, because we are right,
12. See generally G.W. LEIBNIZ, NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter
Remnant & Jonathan Bennett eds., 1981) (commenting on human notions, ideas, and
knowledge). Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) was a German philosopher,
jurist, historian, and mathematician. Id. at xi-xxii.
13. David Hume (1711-1776) was a central figure in what came to be known as the
Scottish Enlightenment, a period roughly between 1700 and 1850. See David Hume, An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF DAVID HUME 44,
44-167 (Ralph Cohen ed., 1965).
14. Daniel N. Robinson, On the Evident, the Self-Evident, and the (Merely) Factual, 47
AM. J. JURIS. 197, 197 (2002).
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but because we are final, at least until the Supreme Court chooses to
participate in our work. 5
When the Supreme Court justices join in, sometimes they
address procedural concerns, and their point is to bring patent law,
including Federal Circuit law, into conformity with the mainstream of
American law.16 This is a point with which I am in accord, and have
been since going on the court.17 On the other hand, sometimes the
Supreme Court explores the substantive parts of patent law, 8 and
there they may not always have the full picture of the way patent
litigation develops and is conducted. An example-is "common
sense," an attribute hard to fault, a useful criterion for determining
patent validity and nonobviousness? 9 Thomas Reid, one of the
writers of the Scottish Enlightenment and known as the father of
Common Sense Philosophy, wrote extensively about common sense,
which meant to him notions that we are obligated to accept in the
ordinary affairs of life.2" Perhaps the writings of Thomas Reid are
what the Supreme Court had in mind when common sense was
lauded as an intellectual approach for determining the
nonobviousness of a claimed invention. Be that as it may, our court
takes pains to follow the law given us by the Supreme Court, even
when we are a bit skeptical about it.
Now, among skeptics there is no group more skeptical than
judges. Oliver Wendell Holmes said, "When the ignorant are taught
to doubt, they do not know what they safely may believe."21 I am
15. There is a lively debate about the desirability and scope of Supreme Court
attention to patent matters. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime
Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 657 (2009).
16. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-28 (2007)
(declaratory judgment jurisdiction); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
391-92 (2006) (test for permanent injunctive relief).
17. See, e.g., VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (applying the same venue rules to patent cases that apply to civil cases
generally). But see Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as reported in
Senate, Jan. 24, 2008) (proposing modification of venue rules for patent cases).
18. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416-17 (2007)
(nonobviousness); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
732-33 (2002) (doctrine of equivalents).
19. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
20. See, e.g., THOMAS REID, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN MIND ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF COMMON SENSE 1 (Derek R. Brookes ed., Penn. State Univ. Press 2000)
(1785). Reid (1710-1796) is enjoying a rehabilitation as a major figure in the
Enlightenment. See id. at 32.
21. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
291, 292 (1920).
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confident he was not thinking about lawyers or professors, and
certainly not other judges.
In an appellate court such as ours, many of the cases turn on
purely legal questions, such as whether the trial court had subject
matter jurisdiction, whether the trial court correctly interpreted and
applied statutory and regulatory provisions, or whether the trial court
allocated the burdens of proof correctly. Even so, and despite the
necessary concern with legal rules and doctrines on which judges
elaborate in our opinions and that constitute much of classroom
teaching, what we often wrestle with in the decisional process is the
truth of, or even a reasonable understanding of, the facts. One reason
for this tension in the judging process is the same tension between the
received wisdom of the past-precedents to which as a matter of law
we are bound, and to which we look for guidance and predictability-
as against our own sense of reality when we are confronted with
conflicting versions of the facts, and, never totally out of sight, a
notion about where justice resides. This tension between precedent
and judicial experience is Bacon's seventeenth century struggle
between orthodoxy and the secular dimension of knowledge, brought
into the twenty-first century.
B. The Judicial Enterprise and Empirical Data
How useful is empirical data when studying the work of the
courts? One use of empirical data has been to develop pseudo-
scientific methods for attempting to understand how different judges
go about deciding cases, based on various types of analyses of our
prior decisions. Sometimes that effort is focused on the Supreme
Court. Not surprisingly, because the issues there lend themselves to
the interplay of politics and ideology, it is an academic favorite to
explain statistically how Justices Scalia or Breyer will come down in
the next contentious case.22
On the other hand, in the courts of appeals where the vast
majority of the federal appellate work is performed, the issues are
likely to turn on more subtle behaviors-how a judge approaches
statutory construction, or one's view of the legitimate range for
distinguishing precedent based on somewhat different facts. At
bottom, though there are notable exceptions, most of our appellate
22. For one of the latest empirical studies of how the ideology of Supreme Court
justices purportedly affects their voting, here focused on intellectual property cases, see
Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual
Property-An Empirical Study, 96 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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cases invoke relatively little ideological force; put another way, they
are not often result-driven. This is certainly the case in the Federal
Circuit.
There have been attempts to classify the judges on the Federal
Circuit using various empirically-based descriptors derived from the
way we vote or write.23 I always seem to fall in the middle
somewhere, perhaps indicating that my writing is not very clear or my
voting is equally confused. Those of us who live and work with the
judges might be helpful in these efforts by classifying colleagues using
somewhat less scientific methods-perhaps indicating those who
might be considered by some to be a bit stubborn, or occasionally
wrong-headed, or most often brilliant (those are the ones who agree
with us).
There are many frontiers of patent law scholarship that do not
involve the courts, as the papers in this symposium attest.
Nevertheless, because of its role in the patent system, the Federal
Circuit gets its share of attention, both plaudits and criticisms. I
hasten to add that I am not going to applaud or defend any particular
decision we have issued. That would not be appropriate for a judge
of the court. Rather, recognizing that in the literature about the court
there is no shortage of critically treated topics, 24 I want to touch
briefly on a couple of illustrative issues-claim construction and
business method patents-and ask how and in what ways empirical
examination is or could be useful.
Claim construction. It has been well said that the claims in a
patent are the basic building blocks of the patent right, so what a
claim means lies at the heart of the process. The fundamental
problem with claims today is that they no longer describe inventions
regarding machines or other physical objects which, if reasonable care
is taken in the writing, can be more or less readily described and
23. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004)
(assessing judges on a spectrum from holistic to procedural); see also Lee Petherbridge,
Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2009) (examining
statistically the proposition that patterns of patent case outcomes support the notion that
there is substantial diversity among Federal Circuit judges in their judicial roles).
24. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575 (2003); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The
Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008); Kimberly A. Moore,
Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 231 (2005); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's
Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007).
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understood.25 How much more difficult it is today when many
inventions involve complex software technologies or biochemical
processes, or even how to conduct an online auction. Too often the
problem is that words, the limitations of language, are such that trying
to put the invention into English following the phrase "I claim . . ." is
difficult, if not almost impossible, for even an adroit drafter.
The claim construction problem is not helped by the fact that
claim drafters are not always adroit-perhaps more emphasis should
be focused on the inventors and their lawyers who draft patents than
on the lawyers who litigate their mistakes. And the problem is aided
and abetted by a patent office process which, for lack of resources
and trained examiners, among other things, results in less than
rigorous reviews; I note in passing some nonhelpful claim-drafting
conventions that grew up in simpler times, such as the rule that it is
forbidden to use simple sentences in a claim.
In a recent opinion, one of our judges, writing for the court,
started his opinion with:
When the complexities inherent in the English language meet
the peculiarities of patent jargon, the result can be the bane of
many unsuspecting patentees. While claim language is
generally the product of the patentee alone, the patentee's
drafting efforts are sometimes aided by the examiner. Usually
such collaborative efforts are constructive. On occasion,
however, these efforts result in confusion, not clarity ....
Careful and straightforward claim drafting by prosecuting
attorneys and agents, and rigorous application by examiners of
the statutory standard to particularly point out and distinctly
claim the subject matter regarded to be the invention, see 35
U.S.C. § 112, T 2 (2000), serve an important public notice
function.26
At one time we dealt with this claim drafting conundrum by
avoiding it. In an infringement suit, the jury would be told to apply its
understanding of the claim to its understanding of the allegedly
infringing widget, and tell us who wins. That worked fine, if you did
not mind that the jury's verdict was a black box, essentially
25. But see Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (detailing the
remarkable saga of what is a "board" to illustrate that even simple concepts can have
complex meanings).
26. Predicate Logic, Inc. v. Distributive Software, Inc., 544 F.3d 1298, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
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unreviewable on appeal unless winning counsel was totally
incompetent about getting some supporting evidence into the case.27
We became concerned that, as technology has become more
complex and patent rights more central to the American economy,
there was a concomitant need for clarity and transparency in the
patent enforcement process. In Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.,28 we took claim construction from the jury and gave it to the trial
judges, whose articulated understandings then would be applied to
the infringement question. We would then be able to review these
claim construction determinations on appeal.
Markman left the door open to the possibility that we would
review the trial judges' claim constructions with some degree of
deference to the judges' determinations. Subsequently we closed that
door firmly, and gave ourselves the final power of determination with
no bow of deference to the trial judges.29 That might have been the
right answer but for the unintended consequences.
Put aside the creation of a new industry, called Markman
hearings. It is what happens after the Markman hearings that seems
so troubling. Many critics think that the current reversal rate of trial
court claim constructions-depending on how one counts, some say
as high as fifty percent-is indicative of a serious problem.3" Among
other consequences, it means that losing litigants have a good shot-
perhaps as good as 50/50-in obtaining a reversal on appeal, with all
that suggests.
Obviously one alternative to reduce the number of reversals
would be to defer more to the trial judges' view of what the claims
mean. But how much deference is a question, and to what aspects of
the trial-fact or law or both-would deference extend? Ultimately,
on what basis would we prefer one trial judge's view of an
indeterminate claim's words over our own, and how would we
distinguish a different judge's view that we do not prefer?
There is a substantial body of literature recently focused on these
questions, some of it empirically-based and reflecting extensive
27. The appellate standard of "substantial evidence" in the record for review of jury
verdicts is among the lowest level threshold for affirming the judgment of a trial court. See
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
28. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
29. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
30. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 24, at 234-38 (reviewing empirical studies on claim
construction reversal rates). But see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and
the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1037-39 (2007)
(discussing problems with relying on statistics to conclude that reversal rates are "too
high").
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research and thought.31 One study sought to determine whether
increased experience at doing claim construction gave district judges,
and in a companion study, International Trade Commission
administrative law judges ("ALJs"), a better batting average in
getting claims right, as measured by Federal Circuit agreement.32 The
notion was that perhaps claim construction could be shown to be a
learnable skill, so that more experience meant better results.
The study concluded that there was no evidence that doing more
claim constructions improved the ability of a trial judge or an ALJ to
get them correct, at least as measured by whether the Federal Circuit
agreed with the claim construction. The author hypothesized that the
explanation is one of three things: (1) trial judges and ALJs cannot
master claim construction, especially if without a technical
background; (2) the Federal Circuit has failed to provide useful rules
or other guidance from which trial judges can learn; or (3) claim
construction is inherently indeterminate.
Candor requires that I recognize yet a fourth possibility: the
Federal Circuit may not be, in any absolute sense, better at claim
construction than the district judges and the ALJs, despite the fact
that we get much more practice than any individual trial judge. If that
is so, and if what we are after is some idea of "essential correctness,"
then measuring the trial judges' claim construction success rates by
what we on the appellate court think about their claim constructions
is not a useful test. The only advantage the appellate court has is that
we have the last word.
There is not yet conclusive empirical evidence to prove or refute
any of these hypotheses, but nineteen years of experience on the
court suggests that none can be dismissed out of hand. Ultimately,
however, it is the indeterminacy factor that most often lies at the
heart of the problem. If so, what alternatives for betterment are
there? One intriguing suggestion is to establish a Chevron-type
deference regime.33 Can further or different empirical studies provide
better or different answers? (As an aside, I was interested to note
that one empirical study of the Markman process concluded that a
31. See, e.g., Lefstin, supra note 30; Moore, supra note 24.
32. David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Study of Patent Claim Construction Comparing
District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming Apr. 2009); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study
of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 259-60
(2008).
33. Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (2008).
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consequence of Markman was to contribute to the fading away of the
doctrine of equivalents.34)
Business methods. The data showing an enormous increase in
patent applications following our State Street3" opinion, attributed to
business method "inventions," are disturbing, if not distressing.36
Should we have found the system claim in that case not to be
patentable subject matter, on the theory that there was an understood
rule against business method patents even when there was no
statutory or judicially-supported basis for such a rule? At the time,
we thought that renouncing the so-called rule against business
method patents was what the law required, and a year later we
applied the State Street rationale to a process claim in A T& T.37 Is the
surge in patent applications, largely attributed to the newly-claimed
business method inventions, a fundamental distortion of the system,
or just a management problem?38 What can empirical studies tell us
about this?
One criticism of the Federal Circuit that is a favorite among
some is that we are not actively exercising our policy levers to ensure
that patents today are doing the job today's world needs. As one
author put it, we are too concerned with whether the law is precise-
that is, reproducible and predictable-and not concerned enough
with whether it is accurate. The author explains that accurate means
correct, which means "responsive to the philosophy of the Patent Act,
to national competition policies, and to the needs of researchers and
technology users."39
In State Street we thought that, by extending patentability to the
broad sweep of modern invention except as specifically limited by the
Act itself, we were acting in full conformity with the philosophy of the
Patent Act and responsively to the needs of technology users. Even
so, a rather sweeping proposal by those who see the court as not
sufficiently policy oriented is to do away with having a single court of
34. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 977-78 (2007).
35. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
36. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 991 n.10 (2003).
37. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
38. For differing views on this issue, see those expressed by Judges Newman, Mayer,
and Rader, all dissenting from the majority opinion in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting); id. at 1011
(Rader, J., dissenting).
39. Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 796.
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appeals handle patent cases, and return to the old days of having
multiple appellate courts, with multiple opportunities for forum
shopping.4" The argument is that this would make for a richer and
more diverse jurisprudence, one more likely to address the underlying
policy issues to which, in this view, the Federal Circuit seems
unwilling to attend.
This is not the place for an extended discussion of the proper role
of courts in a democratic society,4 or of comparative institutional
competence in policy-setting as between a legislature, an
administrative agency, and a court.42 More to the point of the topic of
this symposium, is it important that there is an absence of any
empirical support for the thesis that more courts and more judges will
produce better, rather than simply different, results? Is that an
empirically determinable proposition? Is it fair of us to criticize the
proponents for not having the data to support their thesis, or are we
left only with the rationalists' argument that right thinking people will
know what is right?
A first cut at answering some of these questions with empirical
evidence is being published this Spring (2009) in the Harvard Journal
of Law and Technology.43 The article sets out to test empirically the
basic thesis noted above-that the current institutional arrangement
in which patent appeals are heard by just one court of appeals has
caused a lack of diversity in patent jurisprudence-and the thesis's
conclusion that this has suppressed the policy determinations which
the courts should be providing. On the basis of extensive analyses of
data about the court over time, the author concludes that "the weight
of the evidence ... suggests the interpretation that federal circuit
patent jurisprudence does not lack noticeable heterogeneity in its
decisions."'  Observers of the court's work might find anecdotal
support for this conclusion in our recent decision attempting to clarify
40. Nard & Duffy, supra note 24, at 1651-55.
41. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The courts must declare
the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that
of the legislative body.").
42. For an exchange of views on the proper role of courts in patent law policy-setting,
compare Nard & Duffy, supra note 24, with S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew,
Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard & Duffy, 101 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1735 (2007). See also Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting
Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 142-43
(2008) (discussing the policy levers inherent in the patent laws and the varying marginal
impact resulting from making changes in the different levers).
43. Petherbridge, supra note 23.
44. Id. (manuscript at 8, on file with author).
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the applicable policies governing what is a patentable invention under
section 101, and setting forth the rules derived from that
clarification." The case demonstrates that the court is willing to
tackle policy issues when cast in terms that courts properly may
address, and that when doing so, there is hardly unanimity among the
judges (see the lengthy dissenting views of three of the judges).46
C. The Judicial Enterprise and the Empirical Studies Literature
A final observation about the academic literature and its uses.
The academic commentary I have been discussing is a small sample of
the extensive literature being produced about patent law.47  A
frequently heard comment about the court is that, based on the
paucity of citation to this literature in the court's opinions, the judges
seem either uninterested or unwilling to consider views other than
their own (insular) ones. Though I appreciate the frustration that
comes from feeling that insights derived from thorough research and
scholarly writing are being ignored to the detriment of the society-a
feeling I once shared in full measure-there are structural and
jurisprudential problems that cannot be ignored.
As a structural matter, much of the scholarly research and
writing, as thoughtful and useful as it may be in understanding the
operation of the overall patent system, is not directly applicable to the
work of the court, that is, to the deciding of cases. Some of the
excellent papers presented in this Symposium are examples. Our
institutional function is to decide the cases before us, not opine about
the workings of the patent system in general, and certainly not to
engage scholarly critiques of the court's work, even those that have
merit.
As a jurisprudential matter, there is the question of whether
judges should be influenced by, or even more, rely on, the
propositions or conclusions reached by nonparties-including
scholarly ones-in making decisions that determine the outcome of a
case. At the least, if secondary literature is to play a significant role in
the decisional process, should not the parties to a suit be given
opportunity to review and comment upon the propositions
propounded, just as we do with amicus briefs? Perhaps the academic
community might be able to persuade counsel who litigate patent
45. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
46. Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting); id. at 1011
(Rader, J., dissenting).
47. A quick search for law review articles with the word "patent" in their titles
revealed an average of more than 200 articles per year for the last three years.
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cases to incorporate relevant secondary literature in their initial
briefs. In that way the parties can highlight the material they think is
important to their case, and the opposing party would be on notice of
the material.
Finally, there is a practical problem with regard to judges
keeping up with the current outpouring of scholarly writing on patent
matters. In preparation for each monthly sitting, a judge may be
faced with reading something between 2,600 and 3,600 pages of
densely written briefs, involving twenty to thirty different appeals.
That is before examination of the cases, statutes, appendices, and the
record that the parties have cited or submitted. There is also the
unceasing flow of material to be read and commented upon with
regard to the cases heard in previous months. The bottom line is that
studying the materials relating to the cases to be decided takes
priority over all else, including reading for elucidation or just
pleasure.
All of which is not to say that the important work of the
academic community goes totally unnoticed. A judge may very well
pick up a journal article or a book that catches her eye, especially if it
is in an area of law of general interest to the judge. A diligent law
clerk working on a difficult legal question may search the recent
literature for something of particular relevance, and may call it to the
judge's attention for consideration so long as it does not appear to be
an effort to directly influence the outcome in a particular case. In
short, judges may be more aware of the issues being addressed in the
literature than the absence of specific citation might suggest.
CONCLUSION
I return to the point about whether we really know what we
think we know. That is a conundrum that can be helped, but not
necessarily solved, by empirical evidence. The skeptic might say that
where one comes out on many of the difficult issues in patent law
depends on how one views the known facts-the empirical
evidence-in light of the assumptions with which one begins. As an
optimist, and a one-time empirical researcher, I believe that imperfect
but nevertheless useful information is still better than no useful
information. As a judge, I have learned to live with both.
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